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We analyze within a dynamic model how rms decide on capital investment if
the accompanying adjustment costs are a function of governmental activity. The gov-
ernment provides a public input and decides on the degree of rivalry. The produc-
tive public input enhances private capital productivity and reduces adjustment costs.
We derive the equilibrium in which capital and investment ratio are both constant,
carry out comparative dynamic analysis and discuss the model's policy implications.
Increasing the amount of the public input unequivocally spurs capital investment
whereas the result becomes ambiguous with respect to the impact of rivalry. Since
a reduction in congestion increases the individually available amount of the public
input, crowding out effects may lead to a reduction in the equilibrium capital stock.
Most of the analysis is conducted for general production functions, although the case
of CES technology is also considered.
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The impact of governmental activity on rm investment has been extensively studied in
the last several years. Beginning with the seminal work of Aschauer (1989a, 1989b)
or Barro (1990) more recent models analyze the growth impact of governmental activ-
ity and include aspects of congestion, uncertainty, or excludability (see e. g. Fisher and
Turnovsky (1998), Turnovsky (1999a, 1999b), Turnovsky (2000a) or Ott and Turnovsky
(2006)). Within these models governmental activity consists of two parts: First, the pro-
vision of a productive input and second, the choice of the nancing scheme that is re-
quired to provide a certain amount of the input as well as to internalize external effects
of capital accumulation that arise for a given degree of congestion. But in addition to
this governmental activity also includes nonscal instruments, e. g. the implementation
of legislation and thus to dene the rm's institutional environment (see e. g. Knack and
Keefer (1995) or more recently Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2005)). Thus public policy plays
an important role in the rm's capital investment decision via several channels.
Whilesimplemodelsassumethatoutputmightbe transferred withoutadditionalcostsinto
private capital the literature on investment theory which derives from the 'Tobin q' theory
focuses on the impact of adjustment costs that arise e. g. due to an increase in demand.
A survey of relevant approaches is given by Hamermesh and Pfann (1996) or Cooper
and Haltiwanger (2003) whereas recent empirical studies can be found in Hall (2004). An
industryspecic discussionisdone by Caballero and Engel (1999). Usually, thoseauthors
who focus on capital adjustment costs model them as relation between the investment in
each period and the rm's capital stock. An exception is the paper of Turnovsky (1996)
who develops a onesector endogenous growth model in which capital investment incurs
adjustment costs that are related to governmental activity. This picks up the argument that
rm specic aspects are not the unique determinants of capital adjustment. Aside from
them also the economic environment like governmental activity gains importance.
Our paper merges both strands of the literature. While most models mentioned analyze
the role of scal policy for capital accumulation we focus on the importance of the char-
acteristics of the public input within the rm's investment process. We assume that pri-
vate investment incurs adjustment costs that depend, among others, on the public input.
While the amount provided is the outcome of a scal policy decision the prevailing de-
gree of congestion may be interpreted as the outcome of an institutional policy decision
(see Turnovsky (1996)). What we have in mind is the following: Governmental activities
1here interpreted as being the provision of freely available infrastructure have multiple
impacts on investment in physical capital. First, the amount of the public input gains
importance, e. g. capital productivity is higher in regions that are well endowed with in-
frastructure or the rms' overall investment costs are lower if the factory area is already
developed. Then the public input not only enhances private capital productivity but also
decreases adjustment costs that arise within the investment process. Second, the avail-
ability of the public input may be inuenced by the government. This can be illustrated if
e. g. the degree of congestion is reduced as consequence of driving bans for certain routes
or the implementation of user fees that reduce private demand for infrastructure. To sum
up, both amount of infrastructure and degree of rivalry are the consequence of govern-
mental activity and become especially important to assess the impact of public policy on
the rm's investment process.
The argumentationis incorporatedwithina dynamicmodel and illustratesthat the hitherto
existing focus on the absolute amount of publicly provided infrastructure and the analysis
of the scal instruments oversimplies the context. Since the degree of congestion deter-
mines the individually available amount of the public input it can be shown that rivalry
has an important and ambiguous impact on the capital investment decision.
We analyze within an dynamic model how a rm decides on capital investment if the
accompanying adjustment costs are a function of the rm's investment and the govern-
mental activity. Furthermore we include congestion effects into the model as introduced
by Edwards (1990) or Glomm and Ravikumar (1994) and also incorporated by Turnovsky
(1996). Hence the individuallyavailable amount diminishes with an increase in aggregate
economic activity. The impact of the public input within the dynamics of the model is
twofold: On the one hand it enhances productivity of private capital. On the other hand
the adjustment costs are reduced by the extent of the available public input. With this
respect our setup allows to disentangle the economic implications of infrastructure on the
private investment decision in a production effect and an adjustment cost effect. Carrying
out comparative dynamics we show that a better regional endowment with infrastructure
unequivocally spurs capital investment via the production and the adjustment cost effect.
An ambiguous impact results from rivalry: A reduction of congestion also reduces the
adjustment costs and with this stimulates private capital accumulation. But at the same
time the marginal productivity of governmental expenditures increases due to enhanced
individual availability and this leads to a crowding out of capital investment. The impact
of the production effect on equilibrium capital becomes negative and the incentive for
2capital accumulation diminishes.
The paper is organized as follows: After specifying the assumptions and the central eco-
nomic effects within Section 2 the private investment decision is analyzed in Section 3.
Then the rstorder conditions are discussed. The equilibrium together with the transi-
tional dynamics is derived in Section 5. Subsequently the implications of the public input
on the resulting optimal capital stock and the investment ratio are presented in Section 6.
Within Section 7 the policy implications of the model are discussed and the equilibrium
capital stock is calibrated for alternative parameter constellations in the context of a CES
production function. We close with a short summary while the Appendix includes the
formal derivations of some equations that are used within the paper.
2 The model
The individual rm i produces output, Yi, using private capital, Ki, labour, Li, and a gov-
ernmental public input Gs. The production technology is linearhomogenous in the pri-
vate inputs and
Yi(t) = F(Ki(t);Li(t);Gs(t)) = Li(t)  f(k(t);Gs(t)) ; (1)
where f denotes output per capita and k(t) 
Ki(t)
Li(t).1 The terms f1 and f2 denote the par-
tial derivatives of f with respect to the inputs k and Gs. They are positive but decreasing
(f1 > 0; f2 > 0, f11 < 0; f22 < 0) and the identical cross products f12 = f21 are positive.
Population is constant and consists of L individuals.2 The rms are not charged for the
use use of the public production input but rivalry may arise. For example, various gov-
ernments provide the road network without any fee, and the road network serves as a
productive input for the rms in these countries. Nevertheless, there is congestion on
these roads: The more cars use the roads, the more trafc holdups will arise. The aspect
of rivalry is represented by the congestion function
Gs(e;G) = GkeK e; 0  e  1 ; (2)
1In the following parts of the paper time indices are suppressed.
2We abstract from technological progress. However, the structural results of the model would not be
changed if we introduced labor augmenting technological progress.
3where G species the total amount and Gs the actually available amount of the publicly
provided input. The parameter K = kL denotes aggregate capital while e characterizes
the degree of congestion of the public input G: If e = 0 the governmental input is a pure
public good, as e. g. the legal framework, whereas e = 1 reects the other polar case
of proportional congestion, i. e. Gs = G=L.3 The road network displays partial rivalry,
which is captured by 0 < e < 1 and leads to an individually available amount of roads
G=L < Gs < G. Independent from the degree of congestion the individually available
amount of Gs increases with a rise in G. With this specication of the congestion function
the marginal product of private capital is given by fk 
d f
dk = f1+ f2eGs
k > 0.
Private capital evolves over time as follows: It is reduced by depreciation where d de-
notes the depreciation rate. At the same time capital increases as consequence of private
investment Ii. Thus the net investment of private capital in each time increment is given
by
 Ki = Ii dKi : (3)
We assume that private capital accumulation goes along with adjustment costs, f, that
depend positively upon the amount of investment and negatively on the available public
input.4 The adjustment costs are specied in analogy to Barro and Sala-I-Martin (2004)






; f0 > 0 : (4)






3This specication of the congestion function is borrowed from Edwards (1990). Aside from this there
exist other specications, e. g. Barro and Sala-I-Martin (2004) model congestion as relation between in-
dividual capital and aggregate production. Eicher and Turnovsky (2000) distinguish between absolute and
relative congestion. Following their notation the formulation of congestion in (2) reects the situation of
relative congestion.
4The implications of labor and capital adjustment costs are discussed in detail in the existing litera-
ture (see e. g. Hamermesh and Pfann (1996) for an overview). Within the models analyzed there capital
adjustment costs refer to the relation between investment and the existing capital stock. The impact of pro-
ductive governmental activity within the adjustment process is discussed in the context of a growth model
by Turnovsky (1996).
4With these specications of the production function (1), the congestion function (2) as
well as with the formulation of the adjustment costs (4) it is now possible to identify the
different channels that reect the impact of the public production input within the model.
Startingpointoftheanalysisistheavailableamountof infrastructure, Gs, thatispositively
linked with total amount of G and negatively with the degree of congestion, e.
The impact of the public production input within the model is twofold and includes:
 The production effect: Within production function (1) infrastructure is modeled
as input that is complementary to private capital, fk;Gs > 0. An increase of Gs
not only enhances output directly but also acts indirectly via an increase in the
marginal product of private capital. Additionally, prevailing congestion affects the
productivity of private capital. These direct and indirect effects that act via the
production function will be summarized by the term production effect.
 The adjustment cost effect is also subject to governmental activity: An increase
in Gs reduces the relationship between private investment and governmental activ-
ity, Ii=Gs, and yields a decrease of the adjustment costs. This formulation might
be motivated as follows: If Gs is interpreted as being the amount of infrastructure
available to the individual rm then adjustment costs in the open countryside (low
G) are higher than they are in areas that are already richly endowed with infras-
tructure (high G). Thus governmental activity might inuence the levels of the
individual adjustment costs. A second argument gains importance: The adjustment
costs increase with the level of congestion. Regions with less congestion (low e)
provide a more productive infrastructure to the rms and with this the adjustment
costs are reduced.
In the following part of the paper we refer to the term adjustment cost effect whenever
we analyze effects that arise in the context of the adjustment costs. We use the term pro-
duction effect to illustrate effects that inuence capital productivity. It will be shown that
both effects clearly inuence the equilibrium dynamics. These aspects will be discussed
in detail in Section 5
53 Private capital investment
The individual rm maximizes the present value of the sum of net cash ows between
times 0 and innity, discounted in accordance with the market rate of return, r(t). The net
cash ow in each period is paid out as dividends to the shareholders. We focus on rms
that have a number of equity shares outstanding, and the value of these shares at time 0 is
determined on a stock market to be the amountV(0). Firms pay the wage rate, w, for each
unit of labor whereas the public input is provided at no charge. We neglect adjustment






subject to constraint (3) and an initial value of capital, Ki(0). We analyze the optimization













where q is the shadow price associated with (3). The shadow price has the units of goods
per unit of capital at time t and represents the currentvalue shadow price of installed
capital in units of contemporaneous output. The maximization problem entails the rst
order conditions






















= r : (7c)
Within the rstorder conditions (7a)(7c) we have used the intensive form of the pro-
duction function, f(), and have written capital and gross investment as quantities per unit
of labor,   Ii
Li. Adjustment costs enter the rstorder conditions as follows.
5Sincewefocusonanatomisticrmitisassumedthatthemarketinterestrateisexogenousandconstant.
6The static efciency condition (7a) determines the amount of labor and involves the usual
result that an optimum requires the coincidence of marginal product of labor and wage
rate. There are no adjustment costs associated with changes in labor input. Equation (7b)
represents the second static efciency condition and determines the investment decision
of the individual rm. It indicates that the marginal revenues of an investment (measured
in terms of the shadow price q) must equal the marginal costs of the investment. Without
adjustment costs output could be transferred to capital in a 1:1 ratio. Then the efciency
condition implied q = 1. But now the marginal costs include the adjustment costs and
thus the revenues induced by the rm's investment must increase in order to achieve an
optimum. Equation (7c) is a dynamic efciency condition and determines the optimal
capital accumulation. The brackets include the marginal product of private capital plus
the changes in adjustment costs that are weighted with the extent of investment, fk Ii
¶f
¶Ki.
Note that the marginal adjustment costs decrease with a rise in Ki. This effect is due to the
available infrastructure: Gs increases with Ki (see equation (2)) and thus the relation Ii=Gs
decreases.6 Both, marginal product of capital and marginal adjustment costs are deated
by the cost of capital, q, and the shadow price exceeds unity the more the higher the
adjustment costs are. An optimum requires that the market interest rate, r, coincides with
the sum of (i) net rate of capital gain (
 q
q  d) and (ii) marginal product of capital plus
marginal adjustment costs that are weighted with the investment.




(qKie rt) = 0 (8)
and implies that either the capital stock or its value must equal zero at the end of the
optimization horizon.
4 Implications of the rstorder conditions
The rstorder conditions(7a)(7c) illustratethat thepublicproductioninputand itsqual-
ity (measured by e) inuence the rm's investment decision in various ways. The follow-





















7ing argumentation distinguishes between the production and the adjustment cost effect as
discussed in Section 2.
Within equation (7a) only the production effect emerges: All inputs are complementary
and hence the the marginal product of labor increases with Gs. Compared to a model
without a public production input the optimal amount of labor increases whereas the ad-
justment costs are not affected.
Within the optimality condition (7b) only the adjustment cost effect plays a role: A rise
in Gs reduces the adjustment costs, f, and also the marginal adjustment costs as long as
f0 > 0. The opposite applies for a reduction of Gs that is accompanied by increasing
costs. This reects the fact that investment costs are lower if the factory area is already
developed. If adjustment costs are absent (f = f0 = 0) the marginal product of one unit
capital investment measured in units of output equals the shadow price of capital, q = 1.
In case of positive adjustment costs the shadow price of capital exceeds unity and it is
needed to use more than one unit of output to get one unit of capital. Thus optimality
of investment requires a higher marginal product of investment and the necessary surplus
increases with f. Additionally this effect is reinforced by positive marginal adjustment
costs, f0 >0. The availableinfrastructure, Gs, and theirdeterminantseand G then become
crucial: The lower e and the higher G the higher is also Gs. A higher amount of available
infrastructure reduces the height of the adjustment costs, reduces directly the relation
Ii=Gs as well as f0. One might conclude that more infrastructure increases the incentives
of private investment due to a reduction of the adjustment costs.
In the context of the dynamic efciency condition (7c) the production effect as well as
the adjustment cost effect (indirectly via f0) arises. Since the available infrastructure, Gs,
increases with the individual capital stock, Ki, the marginal adjustment costs decrease
during the process of capital accumulation. Again we begin with the simple case without
adjustment costs and thus a shadow price equal to q = 1. This implies
 q
q = 0 and the
dynamic efciency condition reduces to the well known relation fk  d = r: The net
marginal product of capital must equal the interest rate. Then only the production effect
of governmental activity emerges. If adjustment costs arise (f > 0) the degree of rivalry
becomes crucial since e inuences the production effect and the adjustment cost effect. If
congestion prevails(e>0) individualproductivityof infrastructure depends on the degree
of congestion as well as on the individual capital stock. 7 As consequence the production
effect is inuenced. Aside from this congestion also has an impact on the extent of the
7See e. g. Turnovsky (2000b) for a detailed discussion of this effect.
8adjustment cost effect: It vanishes if the public input is a pure public good (e = 0) and the
adjustment costs rise with an increase in congestion. To sum up: The extents of both the
production and the adjustment cost effect are inuenced by congestion.
5 Equilibrium and transitional dynamics
We now provide a formal analysis of the equilibrium and the corresponding transitional
dynamics. To derive the equilibrium level of private capital it is necessary to specify
the general adjustment cost function in equation (4). Although most of the empirical
and theoretical studies analyze either convex or nonconvex adjustment costs stylized
facts about them do not exist. Actually the costs strongly vary between single industries
(see e. g. Cooper and Haltiwanger (2003)). For our analysis we thus choose the most
simple case in which the adjustment costs are proportional to the relation Ii=Gs and hence





are convex. With this specication we follow Turnovsky
(1996). If one additionally assumes a positive interdependency between Ii=Gs and the
shadow price, q, it is possible to derive the inverse relationship
Ii
Gs
= y(q); y0 > 0 : (9)









= by(q); f0 = b > 0 : (10)
The marginal adjustment costs are constant and b might be interpreted as sensitivity pa-
rameter to analyze the impact of the available infrastructure on f. Together with efciency





8Aside from convex adjustment costs that most frequently are modeled as being quadratic there exist
also nonquadraticcosts. This is usually the case in the context of discrete costs (see e. g. Caballero (1999)
for an overview or Caballero and Engel (1999), Cooper and Haltiwanger (2003) and Thomas (2001) for
discrete adjustment costs within certain industries).
9We now present the discussion in terms of capital per unit of labor, k = Ki
Li. The equilib-
rium is dened as a situationin which the rm's capital and the shadowprice of capital are
constant,  k = 0 and  q = 0. Since we focus on rms acting in competitive markets we as-
sume an exogenous market interest rate, r. Formally, the equilibrium might be described
by a system of differential equations that result from equations (3) and (7c) together with
(9) and (10) as
 k =  dk (12a)
























Equalizing equations (11) and (13) illustrates that the shadow price of capital is also a
function of the investment ratio. It is thus necessary to modify equation (12b) in order to
derive the equilibrium. If we dene the investment ratio as 

















The equilibrium is characterized by a constant capital stock and a constant investment
ratio.
With this it is possible to illustrate the equilibrium (k;µ) as intersection between the
functions  k = 0 from (12a) and  µ = 0 in (14) in a phase plane diagram µ(k) (see Figure 1).
Individual capital as given by equation (12a) remains constant if investment ratio and
depreciation rate coincide. This applies independent from the level of k and hence the
function  k = 0 is parallel to the abscissa at a constant investment ratio denoted by µ = d.
9The formal derivation of equation (14) can be found in Appendix A. Note that a small rm perceives
the aggregate capital stock as constant and exogenous. Hence the growth rate of aggregate capital does not
enter equation (14). The same argumentation holds with respect to extent and changes in infrastructure.









































Figure 1: Equilibrium capital and investment



















 ? 0 : (15)
The sign of the numerator is unequivocally positive whereas the sign of the denominator
is ambiguous and changes for a certain investment ratio ¯ µ  d+ r
2 e > d: If µ < ¯ µ the
denominator is positive whereas it is negative if µ > ¯ µ. Together with the negative sign in
equation (15) function  µ = 0 might be illustrated as presented within Figure 1. It results
the unique equilibrium (k;µ) that is determined by the intersection of both functions.
We now focus on the transitional dynamics of the system and on stability aspects. Since
the equilibrium investment ratio is given by µ < d the following argumentation is carried
out for parameters µ < ¯ µ. Using equation (12a) it becomes obvious that the capital stock
increases (decreases) if the initial investment ratio exceeds (is smaller than) the depreci-
ation rate, d = µ. The horizontal arrows within Figure 1 illustrate this argument. Using
equation (14) the investment ratio increases (decreases) if it is initially right (left) to func-
tion  µ = 0. This is illustrated by the vertical arrows. All together the system is saddle
10See Appendix B for the derivation and a proof of the signs.
11point stable. Initial combinations of capital and investment ratio that lie on the stable path
lead to the equilibrium. For any initial capital stock, k(0), the individuals will choose an
investment ratio so that both, k and µ, are lying on the stable path and thus the equilibrium
will be reached. Note that existence, uniqueness and stability characteristics of the sys-
tem as well as the optimal investmentratio are independent of the extent and the degree of
congestion. However, the equilibrium capital, k, depends on the economy's endowment
of infrastructure, G, and is also affected by congestion. The details are discussed within
Sections 6 and 7.
6 Public inputs and equilibrium
The equilibrium investment ratio, µ, has been derived from equation (12a). It only de-
pends on the depreciation rate, d, and is independent from the public input. In contrast to
this the equilibrium capital, k, is determined by the individually available amount of the
public input, Gs. The following discussion demonstrates the importance to distinguish
between the two parameters of the public input, G and e. In case of a constant invest-
ment ratio and for an exogenously given level of Li the relationship Gs=k determines
also Ii=Gs and with this the level of the adjustment cost and the investment ratio (see
equation (9)). Hence we refer to the adjustment cost effect (denoted by ACE within the
equations) whenever changes in the public input affect the term Gs=k. Analogously we
refer to the production effect (denoted by PE) whenever the marginal product of capital,
fk, is affected. It will be shown that a third effect arises that is denoted by level effect (LE
in equation (19)).
(i) The impact of G: We begin the analysis with a discussion of the positive impact of
governmental expenditures on the equilibrium capital stock. Starting point is the initial
equilibrium capital, k
0, in Figure 2. Formally the impact of an increase of infrastructure



































< 0 : (17)
Introducing equation (17) in equation (16) it can be shown that the equilibrium capital
stock unequivocally increases with a rise of G. Both effects account for that result: An in-
crease in G also rises the individually available amount of infrastructure, Gs, and reduces
the adjustment costs. In addition, due to the complementarityof public and private inputs,
fk;Gs > 0, the productivity of private capital increases. Thus capital investment becomes
more attractive and k unequivocally increases. This result is illustrated by the transition
of the initial equilibrium, k
0, to the new equilibrium, k


























 k = 0
















Figure 2: Impact of governmental expenditures, Gs, on the capital stock, k
(ii) The impact of e: In contrast to the amount of infrastructure the effect of different
degrees of rivalry on the equilibrium capital stock is not clear. We show that an increase
in rivalry which reduces the individually available amount of the public input, may even
increase the investment in the physical capital stock. Again the formal analysis may be








It can be shown that the sign of
¶ µ
¶e depends on the extent of the production and the adjust-

































R 0 : (19)
Usingequations(18) and(19) itbecomesobviousthattheadjustmentcosteffect decreases
the equilibrium capital whereas the production effect increases k. Additionally another
positive effect in the following called level effect arises. It is positive and its extent
depends on the level of the investment ratio, µ, that in equilibrium equals d.
The economic intuition for these effects may be summarized as follows: An increase






capital accumulation becomes less attractive. In contrast to this higher rivalry implies
that in relation to the public input the individually perceived marginal product of private
capital increases. This induces substitution effects which stimulate capital accumulation.
Private capital investment increases as illustrated in the context of Figure 3.11
The gure demonstrates the production and the level effect caused by an increase in con-
gestion, e. g. due to the elimination of driving bans for certain routes. It covers two pro-
duction functions, one that reects a low degree of rivalry (low e) and another with high
degree of rivalry (high e). The increase in congestion leads to a decrease in the productiv-
ity of the individually used amount of infrastructure since there are more trafc holdups.
Hence, compared to infrastructure capital productivity is increased and the production
function is scaled upwards. If the rm's initial capital stock is given by k0, the initial
marginal product of capital is given by the slope of the production function in point B.
Due to the increase in congestion, marginal capital productivity increases relative to in-
frastructure (production effect) and the entire production function moves upwards (level
effect). The rm is relocated to point A. Thus if optimization requires a marginal prod-
uct to be equal to the slope in point B then capital accumulation takes places until k0 is
reached, since in point C the marginal product coincides with the one in point B. Hence,
the production and the level effect together imply k0 > k0.
11Note that due to congestion there is a negative externality in capital accumulation which would have to
be considered in order to analyze welfare economic implications of the respective policy measures. These
welfare implications must be analyzed in the context of an aggregate model. They include the nancing
restrictions that must be met if the governmentalinput is providedwithout user fees (see e. g. Barro (1990))







































Figure 3: Production and level effect due to congestion
In contrast, if the government decreases congestion e. g. by the implementation of driving
bans or the implementation of user fees that reduce private demand for infrastructure,
the productivity of individually used infrastructure increases (less trafc holdups) and
therefore induces a crowding out of private capital. In Figure 3 this would end up in a
reduction of the capital stock and a movement from pointC to A.
Putting the three effects together it becomes obvious that the total effect of an increase in
rivalry on the equilibrium capital stock is not clear: The adjustment cost effect is negative
whereas production and level effect are positive. Hence whether the equilibrium capital
increases or decreases depends on the extents of the effects. However, in both cases 
changes of e or G the characteristics of the equilibrium are not affected: There results a
unique equilibrium that is saddle point stable.
7 Policy implications
While in the last Section 6 the objective was to analyze the general implications of the
public input for the resulting equilibrium capital stock we now focus on the policy im-
plications of the model. Since an increase in G unequivocally spurs private capital in-
15vestment the government can stimulate accumulation via an increase of the amount of the
publicly provided input. Usually the government must meet certain nancing restrictions
with respect to its budget but to address these aspects a closed model is required. We ab-
stract therefrom within this paper. Due to the unclear total effect the policy implications
of the degree of congestion are more sophisticated. Turnovsky (1996, p. 363) argues that
'...the degree of congestion is to some extent the outcome of a policy decision, and once
determined, the degree of congestion turns out to be a critical determinant of optimal tax
policy.' The prevailing degree of rivalry might be interpreted as being the result of institu-
tional arrangements: A ban of driving for trucks on certain routes or the implementation
of road user fees may decrease the volume of trafc thus reducing the degree of conges-
tion. The same result may be achieved as consequence of high gasoline prices that may
be the result of governmental activity (e. g. tax increases on gasoline).12 In the latter case
changes in the degree of rivalry are the outcome of scal policy.
Tobemorepreciseabouttheimpactofdifferentdegreesofrivalryontheindividualinvest-
ment decision it is helpful to specify output per capita in equation (1) as CES production
function




r; A > 0; 0 < a < 1;  1 < r 6= 1 (20)
and to calibrate the equilibrium capital stock for alternative parameter constellations. The
parameter s  1
1+r denotes the elasticity of substitution between the two inputs.
G
L = 1000 G
L = 100
r =  0:5 (s = 2) r = 5 (s = :167) r =  0:5 (s = 2) r = 5 (s = :167)
e = 0 12795.6 1303.4 1754.9 1136.8
e = 0:25 13984.2 1466.5 1128.8 689.2
e = 0:5 15222.6 1796.0 714.6 431.0
e = 0:75 16521.9 2399.4 447.6 282.8
e = 1 17896.7 3108.8 278.2 191.4
Table 1: Equilibrium capital for the CES production function
a = 0:75, r = 0:01, d = 0:05, µ = 0:05, A = 0:4, b = 0:5, G = 1000
12We abstract from the arguments of increasing gas prices that arise due to resource scarcity or market
distortions.
16We focus on different degrees of congestion and distinguish situations in which (i) pri-
vate and public input are highly (r =  0:5) or slightly (r = 5) substitutable and (ii) in
which governmental expenditure per capita are relatively high (G=L = 1000) or relatively
low (G=L = 100). The other parameters are specied as denoted within Table 1 which
summarizes the resulting equilibrium capital stocks.
Taking a look at the resulting values it becomes clear that in case of relatively low gov-
ernmental expenditure per capita (G=L = 100) a reduction of rivalry stimulates private
capital accumulation. The adjustment cost effect dominates both the production and the
level effect. Hence, the reduction of congestion spurs investment and with this leads to an
increase in k. The level of the substitution parameter r does not inuence the direction
of this total effect but its extent. If the government wishes to increase private investment
it may thus either increase G (whereupon any nancial restrictions have to be regarded)
or make institutional arrangements to reduce congestion (e. g. certain bans on driving or
user fees). It is also possible to include both instruments in a policy mix and to use the
revenues that result out of the institutional arrangements in order to nance the provision
of the public input and thus to reinforce the stimulating effect.
The contrary results if the governmentalexpenditure per capita are relatively high (G=L=
1000). Then any institutional arrangements that reduce congestion also decrease the equi-
librium capital stock since production and level effect dominate the adjustment cost ef-
fect. The decrease in congestion induces an increase in the productivity of the public
input. Hence, there is a crowding out of physical capital. In a situation with relatively
ample governmental expenditures, the crowding out effect dominates and thereby leads
to a decrease in private investment.
It is possible to sum up the policy implications of the model: If the government pursues
the goal of stimulating private capital accumulation it may basically choose between s-
cal and/or institutional instruments. Institutional arrangements that reduce the degree of
congestion may even reduce capital accumulation (e. g. if G=L is relatively high) whereas
an increase in the amount of the public input unequivocally spurs investment. The ar-
gumentation makes also clear that if a government enhances its expenditure in order to
stimulate private investment it must also take care not to exceed a certain critical relation
G=L because maybe then the possibility to reduce e in order to stimulate capital ceases to
exist. This emphasizes the argumentation that if the government is becoming too big this
17may restrict its own possibilities of action.
8 Conclusions
Recent discussions stress the point that rm specic aspects are not the unique deter-
minant of capital adjustment. Aside from them also the economic environment like the
provision of productive governmental inputs or the degree of congestion gain importance.
This argument is the starting point of the paper: We analyze within an dynamic model
how a rm decides on capital investmentif the accompanyingadjustmentcosts are a func-
tion of governmental activity. Following Aschauer (1989b), Barro (1990) or Turnovsky
(2000b) we interpret this governmental activity as being congested infrastructure and as-
sume that this affects the rm's capital adjustment costs. Governmental activity con-
sists of scal and/or institutional policies. The former refers to the provision of a certain
amount of the public input whereas the latter applies to the prevailing degree of conges-
tion. We analyze how the equilibrium capital stock is changed if either the amount of
infrastructure or the degree of rivalry are changed. It is possible to identify three effects
of the public input within the model: a production, an adjustment cost and a level effect.
The main results may be summarized as follows: While an increase in the amount of the
public input unequivocally spurs private capital investment and increases the equilibrium
capital stock, the result becomes ambiguous with respect to changes in the degree of
rivalry. Then the direction of the production and the level effect on the one hand and the
adjustment cost effect on the other hand differ. The total effect of changes in the degree of
rivalry then depends on the dominating effect(s). In case of a CES production function it
is shown that the production and the leveleffect dominate if the governmentalexpenditure
per capita are relativelyhigh. Then an increase in congestion leads to a higher equilibrium
capital stock since the individuals perceive capital as being relatively more productive.
The opposite applies if governmental expenditure per capita are relatively low. Then
the adjustment cost effect dominates and the equilibrium capital stock decreases. Thus,
governmental activity that wishes to reduce congestion may even end up in a reduction of
private investment. In addition to this, a policy which intends to foster capital investment
via changes in the available public input must be selected carefully since the appropriate
policy measure depends upon the already existing amount of public input per capita.
18Appendix
A: Derivation of (14)
Rearranging (11) yields q = 1+2by =)  q = 2b y. Thus (12b) results as














From the denition of y = Ii







































































































































































































An atomistic rm interprets the aggregate capital stock as well as the amount of G as




G = 0. The growth rate
of capital per capita results from (3) as
 k
k = 
k  d. Together with    
k

=  µ, 
k  µ and
rearranging  µ equation (14) results.
19B: Analysis of the sign of (15)





































R 0 () µ Q ¯ µ (B.1b)






































R µ : (B.3b)
If µ > ¯ µ the sign of (B.3b) becomes negative; analogously a positive relation holds if
µ < ¯ µ.
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